I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget constraints in the combinatorial auction setting and show that they are Pareto-Optimal and (partially) incentive compatible in certain domains.
Introduction
Bidders' budget constraints have been detected in many auctions (Bulow et al., 2009 ). The implications of budget constraints in auctions have been examined in various settings. In the single-good setting, Gale (1996, 2000) show that all-pay auctions result in higher revenues that first-price sealed-bid auctions and derive an optimal auction (see also Laffront and Robert, 1996) . In the multi-unit setting where multiple copies of the same good are sold, Dobzinski et al. (2008) show that when bidders are budget-constrained there is no incentive-compatible Pareto-optimal auction. When budgets are public, they propose the adaptive clinching auction, a modification of the clinching auction in Ausubel (2004) , and show that it satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual rationality and incentive compatibility (see also Borgs et al., 2005) . In the single divisible good setting, Bhattacharya et al. (2010) show that adaptive clinching makes it sub-optimal to underreport budget, and Hafalir et al. (2011) show that a generalization of the Vickrey auction called the Vickrey with Budgets yields good revenue, incentive and efficiency properties. In the multiple heterogeneous goods setting, budget constraints preclude mechanisms that are Pareto Optimal and incentive compatible (Goel et al., 2012; Dobzinski et al., 2008; Fiat et al., 2011; Lavi and May, 2011) . Certain auction designs such as the simultaneous ascending auction (Milgrom, 2000) and the clock auction (Gul and Stacchetti, 2000) implicitly take into account budget constraints by operating through bidders' demands, but are not incentive compatible.
An important question is whether existing mechanisms perform well in the presence of budget constraints, either in their current format or with some modification. This paper studies the Vickrey-ClarkGroves (VCG) mechanism in combinatorial auction setting. A naive application of VCG to the profile of valuations that disregards budget constraints may lead to the outcome where a winning bidder is unable to pay the externality that he imposes on other bidders. I propose two modifications of the VCG mechanism, truncation VCG and budget VCG, that circumvent this issue while attaining desirable incentive and efficiency properties.
Truncation VCG first truncates each bidder's valuations at his budget and then applies the VCG mechanism to the resulting truncated valuations. Because truncation VCG discards the variation of valuations above budgets, it is neither Pareto-Optimal nor incentive compatible in general. However, when bidders are single-minded, this loss of information is minimal and truncation VCG is individually rational, incentive compatible and Pareto-Optimal. Truncation VCG can therefore be suitable for applications where the single-minded assumption is appropriate, such as auctioning of pollution rights, communication links in a tree or auto parts to buyers desiring a specific model (see Lehmann et al., 2002 , and the references therein). Other potential applications are spectrum auctions where the auctioneer has sufficient information about a bidder's existing technology and wireless infrastructures to be confident that the bidder is only interested in only one specific spectrum bundle.
Budget VCG uses the idea that a bidder must be able to pay the externality that he imposes on other bidders, so only allocations that result in affordable externalities can be chosen. This set of allocations is called the affordable set. Intersecting all affordable sets results in a set of allocations that are jointly affordable by all bidders. The surplus-maximizing allocation from this set is then chosen, and payments are the corresponding externalities which are, by construction, affordable to the winners. Budget VCG induces bidders to reveal their budgets truthfully and, when a non-null outcome is realized, attains ParetoOptimality. Because budget VCG may result in large inefficiencies when the null outcome is realized, it is only appropriate in settings where budget constraints are not too restrictive.
Setting
A seller S wants to allocate a set G of indivisible goods to a set I of bidders. Let X be the set of feasible allocations x, where x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x I ) specifies that bidder i gets bundle x i and must satisfy x i ∩ x j = / 0 for all i = j. A bidder i's valuations over the bundles are summarized by a function u i : 2 G → R + . The valuation from the empty bundle is zero. I assume each bidder only cares about his own bundle and write u i (x) to mean u i (x i ). A bidder i is single-minded if there is a bundlex i such that for any bundle x i , u i (x i ) = u i (x i ) if x i ⊇x i and u i (x i ) = 0 otherwise. In the single-minded domain, all bidders are single-minded. A bidder i also has a budget b i ∈ R + that limits how much he can afford to pay. A bidder's valuation function and budget are private information, unknown to other bidders and the seller. A profile (u, b) = (u i , b i ) i∈I describes the characteristics of all bidders. Let U × B denote the set of profiles.
Let P = {p : p = (p i ) i∈I ∈ R I } be the set of payments. An outcome is a pair (x, p) ∈ X × P that specifies that bidder i gets bundle x i and pays p i . Given an outcome (x, p), the payoff for bidder i is given by v i (x, p) = u i (x) − p i if p i ≤ b i and −∞ otherwise. The seller's valuation is assumed to be identically zero. The payoff for the seller is the total payment v S (x, p) = ∑ i∈I p i .
A direct mechanism elicits valuations and budgets from the bidders and then maps each profile to an outcome using a function φ : U × B → X × P. A mechanism is individually rational if each bidder's payoff is non-negative. A mechanism is incentive compatible if it is each bidder's dominant strategy to report his valuations and budgets truthfully in the elicitation stage of the mechanism. The outcome (x, p) is ParetoOptimal at profile (u, b) if there is no outcome (y, q) such that v i (y, q) ≥ v i (x, p) for all i ∈ I + S, with strict inequality for some i ∈ I + S. Note that in the presence of budget constraints, a Pareto-Optimal outcome need not involve the surplus-maximizing allocation. A mechanism is Pareto-Optimal if its outcome is always Pareto-Optimal at the input profile.
Results

Truncation VCG
Restrict attention to the single-minded domain. A bidder i's truncated valuation is a function u b i : 2 N → R + such that for any bundle
denote total truncated valuation of bidders in group C at allocation x, and let V b C = max x∈X V b C (x) be the maximized truncated valuation for the same group. Truncation VCG chooses an allocation that maximizes total truncated valuation, x VCG (u) = arg max x∈X V b I (x), and charges the associated externalities, p VCG
. A profile is generic if truncation VCG yields an unique allocation. 2 Theorem 1. Suppose all bidders are single-minded. Then truncation VCG is individually rational and Pareto-Optimal. Moreover, at generic profiles, truthful reporting of valuations and budgets is optimal for each bidder.
Proof. Individual rationality is obvious. For Pareto-Optimality, suppose that there is an outcome (y, q) that Pareto dominates a truncation VCG outcome (x, p). Let W be the set of bidders winning at both outcomes, W x be the set of bidders winning at x but losing at y, and W y be the set of bidders losing at x but winning at y. Because truncation VCG maximizes truncated valuation, I have V b
For bidders in W , Pareto dominance and single-mindedness imply they must not be paying more at (y, q) than at (x, p), i.e., q i ≤ p i for all i ∈ W , so seller's revenue from W at (y, q) does not exceed that at (x, p). At (x, p), bidders in W x get a total payoff of at least V b W x (x) − ∑ i∈W x p i , and the seller gets ∑ i∈W x p i from them. Since (y, q) Pareto dominates (x, p), the bidders in W y must pay the bidders in W x a total of at least 
. This means that any misreport that attains y is not profitable for i because he would have to pay
. Now suppose i is winning his bundle of interestx i at the truncation VCG allocation x VCG . Any allocation y with y i ⊇x i gives i valuation of zero, so i has no incentive to try to realize it. Consider any allocation y with y i ⊇x i . By genericity and the fact that x VCG maximizes truncated valuation,
I\i (x VCG ). Therefore, bidder i will pay more for y i than forx i if he misreports to realize allocation y. Since both y i andx i yield the same valuation, such a misreport is unprofitable.
Budget VCG
Let V C (x) = ∑ i∈C u i (x) denote the total valuation of bidders in C at allocation x. Let V C = max x∈X V C (x) denote the maximized total valuation of coalition C. Let F i (u, b) = {x : V I\i − V I\i (x) ≤ b i } be the set of allocations affordable by bidder i. Let F(u, b) = ∩ i∈I F i (u, b) be the set of allocations affordable by all bidders. If F(u, b) is non-empty, budget VCG chooses the valuation-maximizing allocation from F(u, b), x * = arg max x∈F(u,b) V I (x). Payments are externalities:
is empty, budget VCG sets x * i = and p * i = 0 for all i.
Theorem 2. Budget VCG is individually rational, and, when it implements a non-null allocation, ParetoOptimal. Furthermore, it is a dominant strategy for the bidders to report their budgets truthfully.
Proof. Individual rationality is obvious. For Pareto-Optimality, suppose a non-null outcome (x * , p * ) is chosen. Note that at x * , total payoff is V I (x * ), bidder i gets payoff V I (x * ) −V I\i , so the total payoff of bidders in (I\i) together with the seller is V I\i . Suppose that another outcome (y, q) Pareto dominates (x * , p * ). Then it must be that
The right hand side of the inequality is the maximum total payoff that bidders I − i and the seller can get at allocation y: it is the sum of the total valuation of coalition I\i at y and the maximum payment from i. The left hand side is the total payoff that the same bidders and seller get at outcome (x * , p * ). Therefore at least one agent must be strictly worse off at (y, q), contradicting Pareto dominance.
For optimality of truthful reporting of budget, when a non-null outcome is chosen, payoff for bidder i is v i = V I (x * ) −V I\i = max x∈F(u,b) V I (x) −V I\i . The second term is independent of bidder i's report so any profitable budget misreport must raise the first term. Suppose that such a profitable misreportb i exists and results in the allocationx, then it must be thatx ∈ F(u,b i , b −i ) butx / ∈ F(u, b) because V I (x) > max x∈F(u,b) V I (x). Recall that F i (u, b) = {x : V I\i −V I\i (x) ≤ b i } and F(u, b) = ∩ i∈I F i (u, b). Sox ∈ F(u,b i , b −i ) implies that x ∈ F j (u,b i , b −i ) for all j. Because j' affordable set does not depend on i's budget, F j (u,b i , b −i ) = F j (u, b) for all j = i. Hence,x ∈ F j (u, b) for all j = i. Becausex / ∈ F(u, b), it must be thatx / ∈ F i (u, b). Therefore, i's payment atx exceeds his true budget b i , sox cannot yield a higher payoff for i. A similar logic works for the case where a null outcome is chosen.
